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A ccording to the recent Dublin Conference, a cluster muni-tion can now officially be defined as “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions, 
each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive 
submunitions.”3 Throughout the history of the use of cluster munitions, 
their technical specifications, post-conflict legacies and the legislation 
with respect to the ongoing Oslo Process have been debated. This pro-
cess, launched by Norway in 2007, aimed to negotiate a ban on clus-
ter munitions and achieved recent success—the convention was agreed 
upon and will be open for signature in December 2008.
While there are strong opponents and proponents of the cluster-
munition ban, it is only with due consideration of their military utility 
versus humanitarian imperatives that a solution can be devised. Limit-
ed empirical data is currently available on either their military efficacy 
or the effects on human morbidity and mortality rates; further research 
into these factors is needed. 
history
Cluster munitions date to World War II when German forces 
dropped “butterf ly bombs.” These air-deployed munitions held anti-
personnel bomblets that could detonate on impact or be set for delayed 
and anti-handling settings. Civilians were specifically targeted (bomb-
lets were camouflaged to kill farmers at harvest time4), and unexploded 
bomblets were found too unstable to disarm. 
It was not until the Second Indochina War (also known as the 
Vietnam-American War) that cluster munitions were used again—most 
notably in Laos—with any significance. Between 2 and 3 million tonnes 
(1.9 to 2.9 million tons) of ordnance were dropped over Laos from 1964 
to 1973, much of which was cluster munitions that subsequently failed 
to explode. In 2005, the recorded casualties increased from 100 a year to 
almost 200, an increase attributed to a rise in the price of scrap metal, 
which enticed scrap-metal collectors to take greater risks by trying to 
recover the metal from unexploded ordnance. The number of casualties 
was later reduced because more economic opportunities became avail-
able, according to Landmine Monitor.
Aside from the butterf ly bombs in WWII, modern cluster bombs 
were designed in the context of the Cold War to attack large military 
formations; furthermore, they act as force multipliers, reducing the 
logistics and manpower risked for a military goal.5 The footprint of a 
single cluster munition can be in the region of half a square kilome-
ter (nearly one-quarter square mile). The rationale for cluster bomb use 
is important, as the military efficacy of them is in some dispute. “No 
detailed military study of the military utility of these weapons … has 
ever been made public.”4
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Cluster munitions have been used in at least 23 countries, produced in 33 and stockpiled in over 70; their 
submunitions number into the billions.1 They cause lasting humanitarian problems and have recently been 
the target of campaigns to ban their use. This article aims to summarize the history, utility, legacy and 
legislation surrounding cluster munitions.2 
Clearance is hampered by a lack of access to and visibility of the 
explosive remnants of war. Indiscriminate use and high failure rates 
are cited as the two areas of concern giving grounds for humanitarian 
scrutiny of cluster weapons,6 and according to research by the Cluster 
Munitions Coalition, a coalition working to ban cluster munitions in-
ternationally, at least 60 percent of casualties from unexploded cluster 
munitions are children.1
During the first Gulf War in 1991, over 13 million submunitions 
were used,6 of which around 400,000 bomblets failed to detonate4 due 
to factors such as poor manufacture, poor use and inclement weather 
conditions.7 With regard to this last factor, some cluster munitions’ self-
arming capacities are particularly susceptible to high winds or varia-
tions in altitude when dropped—for instance if conditions do not allow 
the munitions’ subunits to spin properly, they cannot arm and detonate 
as intended. During the post-Gulf War cleanup of unexploded ord-
nance, seven U.S. troops were killed in one accident.8
Records from Kosovo in 1999 suggest that cluster munitions were a 
weapon of convenience, while post-conflict studies concluded that the 
attacks had little immediate impact.9 In 2003, Human Rights Watch 
criticized the number of cluster-munition attacks by the United States 
An undetonated cluster submunition with parachute deployed, lying on the ground out-
side an Afghan village.
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and the United Kingdom forces that affected civilians.10 
After the first Gulf War, however, the military recorded 
that “Iraqi units were devastated and demoralized. … The 
fact that the ground war lasted only four days … can be 
largely attributed to the effect of cluster munitions.” 4
Scope
Cluster munitions can deploy large amounts of explo-
sives over a wide area and can be ground- or air-launched. 
They are also multipurpose weapons with variants that 
affect vehicles, roads, personnel and electrical stations 
(deploying reels of conductive wire).4 They can contain 
chemical weapons or lay landmines. Initially intend-
ed to break up concentrations of armored vehicles and 
infantry,11 they have evolved for a variety of uses. In gen-
eral, they consist of a canister, which breaks open to re-
lease submunitions over an area known as a “footprint.” 
Billions of cluster submunitions are stockpiled12 in over 70 
states and produced by 33 countries today.13
Older models of cluster munitions are simpler and gen-
erally do not have guidance or self-destruct mechanisms. 
Submunition fuzes are armed through the spinning mo-
tion that occurs after they are jettisoned from the parent 
casing, and malfunction can occur during either of these 
processes. The “all-ways acting fuze” is designed to en-
sure the device explodes even if it does not land in the cor-
rect alignment; however, it also acts as an anti-handling 
device, making UXO much more likely to detonate with a 
small movement.4 
Failure rates for cluster munitions are so high that they 
are accounted for in the planning of military operations.13 
In the past 42 years, nine countries confirmed the use of at 
least 440 million cluster submunitions, with average fail-
ure rates between 5 and 30 percent. A minimum of 22 to 
132 million would therefore have become ERW.14 Several 
operational factors inf luence the reliability of submuni-
tions, including poor delivery technique, age of the sub-
munition, weather and terrain.13 Recent tests in Norway 
have shown that self-destruct features are often not as reli-
able as manufacturers claim.15
The United Kingdom has agreed to withdraw muni-
tions from service that cannot self-neutralize, cannot dis-
criminate between targets, have explosive content or have 
numerous submunitions.16 China and Russia have indicat-
ed they would not replace all their submunitions. Russia 
claimed that modern cluster munitions are reliable, safe 
and effective, and it might be better to discuss munition 
design and best practices for usage rather than implement 
new legislation.17
So many cluster munitions are held by so many states, 
it would be understandable to say that their military util-
ity has grown beyond question. This argument, however, 
has not to date been made coherently.18 Cluster munitions 
apply an area effect (i.e., the footprint of the attack) for a 
military advantage; therefore, the effects of any attack 
should be in proportion to the target and the importance 
of the military goal. Cluster munitions used in an area of 
civilian and military cohabitation, however, almost guar-
antee civilian casualties.13 The military efficacy of cluster 
munitions has been further questioned after the deaths of 
U.S. troops during and after the first Gulf War, killed by 
their own UXO, not to mention the impediment to mobil-
ity when operating in contaminated areas.19 There have also been incidents of other 
troop casualties from cluster munitions in post-conflict situations, including NATO 
troops in Kosovo.
Legacy
The main type of submunition that was dropped on Laos has a life expectancy in 
the soil of approximately 100 years, and while today some are found badly corroded, 
others look almost new.20 There is growing interest in the effects on ERW by the natu-
ral environment and also the effects of removing them: “The consequences are …like-
ly to cause an ERW problem resulting in … damage to the environment.”21
Despite advances in clearance vehicles and the use of special detecting animals, 
clearance generally must be done manually. A recent environmental impact study 
undertaken by the United Nations Mine Action Service found that removal operations 
significantly damage the environment, and long-term damage arises from destruction 
of flora, contamination of water systems and damage to the natural habitats of wild-
life.22 Disposal of ERW by burning or detonation releases huge quantities of metal 
fragments, dust and nitrogen oxides into the environment,23 although it is possible 
to incinerate ERW and reclaim the energy, or utilize the chemicals for other purpos-
es.24 Richard Kidd, former Director of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, argues 
that “the problems associated with cluster munitions are not nearly as bad as other 
ERW … [and] there simply is no large-scale demand for financial resources to clear 
cluster munitions.”17
On the other hand, Lao farmers are gradually expanding the land they use, and 
this involves a risk of exploding UXO, resulting in serious injury or death. In case 
studies carried out by Richard Moyes of Landmine Action and the Cluster Munitions 
Coalition, land is abandoned only if other economic options are available. People 
without options are forced to use contaminated land by necessity.25, 14 ERW degrade 
habitats by altering food chains, making conservation of protected areas difficult, and 
polluting the soil and water supplies.25 There are those, however, that argue that the 
very presence of ERW is protective of the natural environment, as it prevents human 
development, which may otherwise destroy natural ecosystems. 
Some evidence from Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere shows there is a signifi-
cantly greater risk of being killed by a submunition than by an anti-personnel land-
mine.12 In a 2006 study by Handicap International, casualties from cluster munitions 
Close-up of an undetonated cluster submunition.
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were greater than the predicted value based on landmine data, as well as 
being disproportionately comprised of civilians (98 percent).14 It should 
be noted, however, that Steve Mannion for The HALO Trust concluded 
there is far less threat from landmines to civilians, and that submuni-
tions are unlikely to detonate unless handled or thrown.26 Once people 
realize what cluster munitions are, they can often be avoided more easily 
than other UXO unless the cluster munitions are hidden by dense veg-
etation or other means.
Those most likely to disturb and detonate ERW are farmers, children 
and scrap-metal collectors. Injuries sustained include multiple trau-
matic amputations of limbs, burns, puncture by shrapnel, ruptured ear-
drums and blindness.25 
The International Committee of the Red Cross observed that those 
killed or injured by submunitions in Kosovo were 4.9 times more like-
ly to be under 14 years of age than victims of anti-personnel mines. 
According to the ICRC, “This may be due to the fact that such submu-
nitions are often brightly coloured, lying on the ground and assumed to 
be duds.” 27
ERW pose a crippling threat to the development of a community.28 
There are costs incurred not only in clearing land for use, but also in 
caring for those injured and loss of land use due to fear of ERW. Prioriti-
zation of clearance, focusing on the number of square kilometers of pro-
ductive land that has been lost,24 is important where it is not possible to 
clear every square meter of contaminated land.20 
From 1993–2007, the United 
States donated over US$1.3 billion 
toward humanitarian mine action (includ-
ing cluster munitions abatement)20 and the United 
Kingdom has contributed significant resources to under-
standing the extent of the problem as well. Many NGOs, however, 
feel that the users of cluster munitions have done little to contribute to 
understanding the harm caused by these weapons.6
Legislation
Recommendations based on existing legislation have been put for-
ward to guide best practice when cluster munitions are deployed, in-
cluding responsibilities to provide information and warnings to civilians 
both during and after conflict.25 Despite these recommendations, there 
is no agreement over which rules of international humanitarian law are 
relevant, although legislation exists to cover indiscriminate weapons 
and obligations to clear landmines. 
Additional Protocol I (1977) of the Geneva Conventions sets out 
rules regarding distinction, discrimination, proportionality and feasibil-
ity in the use of weapons.29 Many feel cluster weapons violate the princi-
ples of proportionality, distinction and discrimination,11, 29 and there is 
40 years’ worth of evidence concerning consistent civilian harm.7
In 1993, the 1980 U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weap-
ons30 was updated with a fifth protocol on ERW.31 Adopted in 2003 and 
entering into force in late 2006,32 it was criticized for not being strongly 
worded enough.25 The perceived weaknesses in the CCW were the cata-
lyst for formation of the Oslo Process, which takes a harder line toward 
cluster munitions.1
Other legislation of relevance is the Rio Declaration of 1992, 
Principle 24 of which states that “warfare is inherently destructive of 
sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law 
providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and 
cooperate in its further development.”33
Corporate social responsibility is also relevant, especially relating 
to companies producing cluster bombs. This requires voluntary engage-
ment, although the U.K. government believes this is how business should 
account for economic, social and environmental impacts.34
The Ottawa Convention,35 under which signatories agree to ban 
anti-personnel landmines, holds some parallels for cluster bombs, but 
the blurring of boundaries between the two types of weapons can be un-
helpful as there are some distinct differences. For practical purposes, 
cluster munitions do not fall under the Ottawa Convention, and there-
fore some believe they require specific legislation.36
One notable absentee from the Ottawa Convention and discussion re-
lating to cluster munitions is the United States. It is the world’s largest 
single financial contributor to mine and UXO clearance, yet many still 
feel it pays lip service to the cluster munitions issue.37 The United States 
still produces, uses and sells cluster munitions; however, in 2007 the Unit-
ed States placed restrictions on the sale or transfer of these weapons.38
Ban Initiative
The Cluster Munition Coalition was founded at The Hague in 
November 2003 to protect civilians from cluster munitions; it consists 
of around 300 civil-society organizations.39 It was bolstered by Norway’s 
declaration in late 2006 that it would work toward an international 
ban, following frustration with a lack of effort by the CCW (negotia-
tions  which are ongoing).18 In February 2007 the United Nations, CMC, 
ICRC, some interested countries, and other humanitarian organiza-
tions met in Oslo to discuss means of moving toward a ban. This became 
known as the Oslo Process, which aims to “prohibit the use, produc-
tion, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unaccept-
able harm to civilians.”4 Follow-up meetings have occurred with the aim 
 An undetonated cluster submunition lying on the ground outside an Afghan village.
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of concluding the process by the end of 2008; 
an agreement was reached at the cluster muni-
tions conference held in Dublin, Ireland, in 
May 2008. (See additional article on this sub-
ject on page 65.)2
In the author’s opinion, an outright ban 
on cluster munitions is unlikely to provide a 
workable solution to the humanitarian prob-
lems posed by these weapons because it would 
likely be ignored by many states.
Possible Solutions
One solution that has been proposed is to 
reduce the quantity of submunitions per clus-
ter munition, leading to a lower likelihood 
of leaving ERW. For instance, Germany has 
proposed the use of cluster munitions with 
less than 10 submunitions that are sensor- 
fuzed.28 A more radical measure is using 
non-explosive “kinetic energy rods” in clus-
ter munitions, which can pose no ERW threat 
as they mechanically destroy targets to which 
they are guided to.40 Finally, a move from 
mechanical to electrical fuzes would reduce 
the l ikelihood of events in which fai lure 
might occur.4
Definition of cluster munitions is impor-
tant; some states feel a weapon should not be 
referred to as a cluster munition unless it has 
a minimum number of subunits, which would 
allow them to possess “area-effect weapons” 
that are not defined as cluster munitions. 
Aerial photograph showing craters over impact site of a cluster munition.
There is some logic to this argument as, below 
a certain number of submunitions, the prob-
lems associated with cluster munitions dwin-
dle into insignificance, or to the significance 
of multiple single munitions with no subunits.
Conclusion
It seems that cluster munitions are suit-
ed for a form of warfare unlikely in modern 
conflict. Those who would support their use, 
however, are undermined by the lack of evi-
dence of military efficacy and drowned out 
by those voices against cluster munitions that 
have growing evidence to support their point. 
Not only are cluster munitions viewed as an 
indiscriminate weapon in their mechanism of 
area effect, but in the past they also have been 
used in a seemingly indiscriminate manner, 
leaving a profound legacy.
Military forces would do well to identify 
the circumstances in which cluster munitions 
have conferred a real military advantage over 
other munitions, and to provide recommen-
dations for the development of viable alter-
natives and better guidance for commanders 
on how and when to use such weapons. There 
need to be more rigorous restrictions put 
on munitions’ undetonation rates and self- 
destruct features. 
Three distinct constituencies appear to be 
forming in response to the Oslo Process as it 
pursues a wholesale ban on all cluster bombs. 
First, there are ban proponents who feel that 
these weapons will always cause unneces-
sary civilian harm without more fundamen-
tal changes to individual states’ practices, and 
they advocate for nothing less than a total 
ban.7 Second are opponents of the ban—most 
notably the United States, whose stance hard-
ened against any new convention that spe-
cifically sought to ban cluster munitions in 
the run up to the February 2007 Oslo meet-
ing.37 This is, however, an over-simplification; 
in 2007 the U.S. Congress took steps to place 
controls on cluster munit ion stockpi les, 
design, manufacture and exportation. Finally, 
there are moderates who see compromise as 
the only viable resolution for the issue. The 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a 
recent publication, stated, “Today, no seri-
ous actors advocate a total prohibition against 
all … cluster munitions.”11 Indeed, it is possi-
ble that pressure for the over-rigorous appli-
cation of humanitarian principles in war to 
cluster munitions, without a realization that 
states will continue to use area-effect weap-
ons, will weaken the Oslo Process.
See Endnotes, page 112
The ideas expressed in this article are those 
of the author and do not ref lect those of the 
British Royal Marines or any organization 
with which the author is affiliated.
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